














IWMI’s mission is to foster and support sustainable increases in the productivity of irrigated
agriculture within the overall context of the water basin. In serving this mission, IWMI con-
centrates on the integration of policies, technologies and management systems to achieve
workable solutions to real problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and
water resources.
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer modeling
to experience with water users’ associations—and vary in content from directly applicable
research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends. Some research
reports are narrowly focused, analytical, and detailed empirical studies; others are wide-rang-
ing and synthetic overviews of generic problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IWMI staff and their collaborators, we
welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally by IWMI’s own staff
and Fellows, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and distributed both in
hard copy and electronically (http://www. cgiar.org/iimi) and where possible all data and
analyses will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports may be copied freely and
cited with due acknowledgment.1 iii
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Summary
This report deals with the results of a study con-
ducted by the International Water Management
Institute (IWMI) in collaboration with the National
Institute for Land Development (INAT) to assess
the impacts of the current national irrigation man-
agement transfer program in Colombia. In 1990,
the Government of Colombia adopted a new na-
tional policy to transfer management of its irriga-
tion districts to water users’ associations (WUAs).
This report examines the context of transfer, the
basic transfer strategy, powers and functions de-
volved, and the impacts of transfer on irrigation
management and irrigated agriculture in three
sample irrigation districts.
Two districts that were not transferred until
1995 and 1996 were also selected to enable com-
parison between schemes that had and had not yet
been transferred during the period of historical
analysis. Impacts measured include costs of irriga-
tion to the government and the farmers, financial
solvency of the irrigation districts, quality of irriga-
tion operations and maintenance, and the agricul-
tural and economic productivity of the irrigation
systems. Data were collected through interviews
with irrigation management staff and farmers, sec-
ondary data available from irrigation and agricul-
ture departments, a sample survey of farmers, and
direct inspection of irrigation networks.
The national irrigation management transfer
program in Colombia adopted in 1990 can be char-
acterized as significant but only as a partial devo-
lution of management to water users. The govern-
ment maintained considerable advisory influence
over the districts for several years, exercising some
control over O&M plans and budgets, and resist-
ing district attempts to release large numbers of
staff. After adoption of the 1993 Land Develop-
ment Law, in 1994, this control has been relaxed
considerably as districts gained almost complete
control over management. However, powers de-
volved do not include a formal water right or own-
ership of irrigation scheme infrastructure. Also, the
government has not made it clear whose responsi-
bility it will be, and under what terms and condi-
tions to finance possible future costs of rehabilita-
tion.
Management transfer prompted a number of
managerial changes aimed at improving manage-
ment efficiency and accountability of district staff.
Transfer resulted in a significant shift in the bur-
den of cost from the government to farmers, which
has generally been accepted by farmers. But trans-
fer has not had substantial impacts on the perfor-
mance of operations and maintenance, or on the
agricultural and economic productivity of irrigated
land or water, neither improving negative perfor-
mance nor causing detriment where performance
is positive.
This report raises concerns about how lack of
a comprehensive devolution policy for the irriga-
tion subsector can discourage farmers from invest-
ing in the long-term sustainability of their irrigation
schemes. More attention is needed toward using
the transfer process to create local management
self-reliance and ensuring that needed support sys-
tems for local management are in place prior to
implementation of irrigation management transfer
programs.1
This report deals with results of a study to
assess the impacts of the current national
irrigation management transfer program in
Colombia. The report examines the context
of transfer, the basic transfer strategy, and
its impacts on selected systems. Impacts
measured include costs of irrigation to the
government and the farmers, financial sol-
vency of the irrigation districts, quality of
irrigation operations and maintenance,
and the agricultural and economic produc-
tivity of the irrigation systems.
In 1976, the Government of Colombia
first transferred management of irrigation
districts from the government to WUAs for
the Coello and Saldaña irrigation districts
in the Tolima valley in central Colombia
(Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1996). Af-
ter a hiatus of a decade and a half, largely
due to economic recession and political
concerns, in 1990, the government adopted
a new national policy to transfer manage-
ment of all of its irrigation districts to
WUAs. In the same year, the government
resumed transfer of irrigation districts, be-
ginning with the transfer of the
Roldanillo-Unión-Toro (RUT) and Rio
Recio districts, in the relatively prosperous
Cauca and Tolima valleys.
Global Trend toward Devolution
Largely driven by government fiscal short-
ages and a common inability to raise suf-
ficient revenues from collection of water
charges, since the 1970s, governments
around the world have adopted programs
one after another to devolve responsibility
for irrigation management to WUAs
(Johnson, Vermillion, and Sagardoy, eds.
1995). Consistent with overall structural
adjustment programs, irrigation manage-
ment transfer has been supported by the
major international development banks
(World Bank 1993; EDI 1996; Arriëns et al.
1996). The reforms generally include efforts
to organize WUAs, train future managers,
make essential structural repairs, and ne-
gotiate and formalize agreements between
the government and the water users.
As the reforms are normally motivated
by financial pressures and driven by do-
nor deadlines, devolution policies tend to
be adopted ahead of identification of a
practical and integrated strategy for imple-
mentation. There is a significant gap of
knowledge about actual results of IMT—
which strategies do and do not work, and
what prerequisites are necessary to sup-
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port sustainable local management of irri-
gation. These questions are global in rel-
evance. To date, there has been a lack of
systematic, comparative research to an-
swer these questions (Vermillion 1997) to
facilitate policy makers and farmer leaders
to make better strategic decisions and in-
vestments. This report is part of a com-
parative research program at the Interna-
tional Water Management Institute to ex-
amine the modalities and impacts of IMT
in several countries through a common
methodology (Vermillion et al. 1996).
The most important research ques-
tions related to management transfer are—
1. Under what conditions should trans-
fer be attempted or not?
2. What kinds of external support are
necessary to make transfer work?
3. What have been the impacts of transfer
in those districts already transferred?
The third issue is the focus of this report,
although some of the findings herein contrib-
ute partially to the other two questions.
1In all cases, sample siz-
es were more than 5 per-
cent of farmers. Sample
sizes were 91 farmers in
RUT, 59 in Rio Recio, 88
in Samacá, 56 in San
Rafael, and 90 in Maria
La Baja.
2Some data were un-
available for Rio Recio
and Maria la Baja
schemes, hence they are
not included in some ta-
bles and charts.
Methodology and Study Sites
This report first describes basic aspects of
the agricultural, socioeconomic, and
physio-technical context of selected irriga-
tion systems in Colombia. Then it describes
the policy and basic arrangements for
management transfer. Against this back-
drop, impacts are measured and to an ex-
tent, explained. Data were collected
through interviews with irrigation man-
agement staff and farmers, secondary data
available from irrigation and agriculture
departments, a sample survey of farmers,
and direct inspection of irrigation net-
works.
1 Sample farms were selected by
random stratified sampling, in head,
middle, and tail locations along canals.
Annex 1 is a map of the RUT District
showing locations of sample farms that
were thus selected (Giraldo 1997).
The report is a comparison of trends
in performance in five schemes. Three of
the irrigation districts selected for the
study (RUT, Rio Recio, and Samacá) were
transferred early enough to enable com-
parisons of performance for 4 or 5 years
before and after transfer.
2 The remaining
two schemes—San Rafael and Maria La
Baja—enable comparison between already
transferred and not yet transferred
schemes for the period of analysis between
1986 and 1995, as the former was trans-
ferred at the end of 1995 and the latter in
1996.3
Irrigated Agriculture and Transfer
Policy
Approximately 80 percent of Colombia has
a humid and tropical, or warm temperate
climate. Of an estimated 18.3 million hect-
ares of cultivable land, 3.8 million hectares
are actually cultivated at present. Of an
estimated 7.4 million hectares of land that
is potentially irrigable or could be produc-
tive with installation of drainage or flood
protection facilities, 750,000 hectares are
actually equipped with irrigation or drain-
age facilities at present (MOA 1990).  Co-
lombia still has considerable potential to
expand the area under irrigation.
Colombia’s mountainous terrain, high
rainfall, and fertile volcanic soils create
conditions conducive to small-scale devel-
opment of irrigated agriculture. A wide
range of crops, from tropical to temperate,
can be grown. The most widely cultivated
crops are rice, maize, sorghum, soybean,
pasture, potato, and vegetables.
The private sector has developed and
managed 463,000 hectares (or 62%) of the
current functional irrigable land in Colom-
bia. The public sector has developed only
38 percent. Development and operating
costs of public irrigation schemes are on
average about double those of privately
developed schemes (FAO 1994).
Colombia’s extensive experience with irri-
gation development in the private sector
and the sector’s well-known higher levels
of economic efficiency have created general
expectations that farmers, given the right
circumstances and training, are capable of
taking over management of public irriga-
tion schemes and managing them more ef-
ficiently than the government.
In Colombia, the first impetus for man-
agement transfer came from water users
themselves, who lobbied the government
to take over management of the schemes in
the Coello and Saldaña districts in the
Tolima valley. In response, the government
created HIMAT
3 in 1975 and gave it
(among other responsibilities) the dual
mandate to first, take over management of
all 23 public irrigation districts in Colom-
bia and second, establish and form WUAs
in the districts to eventually take over
management from HIMAT. Coello and
Saldaña districts were transferred to the
users in 1976 under an inter-sectoral con-
stitutional principle referred to as “delega-
tion of administration” (Plusquellec 1989).
However, the delegation did not include
transfer of ownership for scheme assets
nor full WUA control over budgets, O&M
plans, and personnel.  HIMAT retained a
strong supervisory role in administering
budgets and O&M plans, and strongly re-
sisted early attempts by the WUAs to re-
duce the number of staff employed by the
districts (who were HIMAT staff before the
transfer).
Nevertheless, the relatively successful
results of this experiment (Vermillion and
Garcés-Restrepo 1996) strengthened politi-
cal resolve to make management transfer a
national policy. Toward the end of the eco-
nomic recession of the 1980s, the govern-
ment was ready to resume implementation
of the devolution policy as part of its over-
all strategy of economic liberalization and
political decentralization.
4  Roldanillo-
Unión-Toro (RUT) and Rio Recio were the
first irrigation districts to be transferred as
part of the “new wave” of transfers, in
1990. Transfer of several other districts fol-
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3HIMAT is the Institute
for Hydrology, Meteo-
rology, and Land Devel-
opment. In 1994, respon-
sibility for meteorology
was removed from the
agency and its name
was changed to the Na-
tional Institute for Land
Development (INAT) to
reflect its narrower fo-
cus on development of
irrigation, drainage,







lowed over the next few years (Garcés-
Restrepo and Vermillion 1995).
Recognizing the problems inherent in
the partial delegation of administration,
and needing to induce greater farmer in-
vestment in future expansion efforts, the
government passed the Land Development
Law No. 41 in 1993 and its associated en-
abling Decree Nos. 1278 and 2135. To-
gether, the new law and decrees deter-
mined that transfer would thereafter place
full control over irrigation district finances,
O&M procedures, and personnel in the
hands of the WUAs. The new agreements
were referred to as “concessional con-
tracts” rather than delegation of adminis-
tration.  This was a significant enlarge-
ment of devolution. However, even under
the new law, the WUAs were only given
use rights, not ownership over irrigation
infrastructure.
Program Implementation
Under the transfer process, HIMAT, or,
INAT, as it was renamed after 1994, facili-
tated the formation of a WUA. This in-
cluded preparation of a constitution, for-
mulation of bylaws, and designation of
basic rules and sanctions. Farmers elected
representatives to a Board of Directors.
This was followed by preparation and
signing of a concessional contract between
INAT and the WUA. In each scheme, the
transfer process may or may not include
training, rehabilitation, or changes in
O&M procedures, water fees, or personnel.
All such issues are resolved on a case-by-
case basis through negotiations between
the WUA and INAT. At the beginning of
1990, only Coello and Saldaña (with a to-
tal irrigable area of 39,603 ha) had been
transferred. By the end of 1996, 17 of the
23 public irrigation districts in the country
had been transferred to WUAs. This con-
stitutes 115,695 hectares of a total of
241,077 hectares of irrigated area previ-
ously under public management (Alvarez
and Garcés-Restrepo 1996).
Originally all districts in the country
were planned to be transferred by 1997. The
government clearly pursued a strategy of
transferring management of the “easier”
districts first. These tended to be districts
that were more prosperous and financially
viable, which did not have major infrastruc-
ture disrepair and where farmers were more
willing to take over management.  However,
by 1997, after experiencing difficulties in
transferring Maria La Baja and other dis-
tricts, the  government temporarily discon-
tinued implementing the program, ostensi-
bly to enable it to conduct more in-depth
analyses of what to do about the remaining
districts considered to be most problematic.
The remaining districts tended to have vari-
ous problems such as high costs of irriga-
tion, technical problems, facilities in a state
of disrepair, lower productivity, lower prof-
itability of irrigated agriculture, social un-
rest, poverty, and inability to collect ad-
equate irrigation fees from farmers.5
Transfer Process in Five Districts
The location of the five sample districts is
indicated in figure 1 and basic information
on each district is summarized in tables 1
and 2, and annex 2.  These are small to
medium-size schemes, ranging from an
irrigated area of 560 hectares to 10,200
hectares and with design discharges from
0.6 m
3/s to 14 m
3/s.  Out of these five
schemes, two are river lift pump schemes,
two have small reservoirs and the other is
a river diversion scheme.  Annual rainfall
varies from 690 mm in the Samacá scheme
in the mountainous Boyaca State to 1,890
mm in the Maria La Baja scheme on the
Atlantic coast (table 1). As indicated in
table 2, except for the Rio Recio district,
the large majority of farm holdings are less
than 10 hectares each.  In Samacá and San
Rafael, 95 percent of farm holdings are less
than 5 hectares each in size.
FIGURE 1.
Map of Colombia showing locations of sample irrigation districts.6
TABLE 1.
Basic characteristics of sample districts.
Item RUT Rio Recio Samacá San Rafael Maria La
Baja
State Valle Tolima Boyacá Boyacá Bolivar
Design area (ha) 13,000 23,600 3,000 590 19,600
Irrigated area (ha) 9,700 10,200 2,893 560 9,260
Water source River lift River diversion Reservoir River lift Reservoir
Intake structure Pump Gated weir Vertical gates Pump Vertical
gates
Designed Q (m3/s) 14 11 1 0.6 20
Main canal length (km) 87.7 38.7 29.7 Buried pipe 58
Total canal length (km) 170.7 135.8 58 Buried pipe 284.4
Area per km canal (ha) 57 74 51 – 33
Turnout type Pump Sliding gate Pump and Riser Sliding gate
sliding gate
Control structures (#) 16 234 69 16 na
Lowest level water measured Along main Farm inlets Main intake Main intake Main intake
canal
Water delivery efficiency (%)* 53.7 74.1 86.1 80.5 54.7
Main soil type Clay, loam Clay, loam Clay, loam Clay, clay-loam Loam, clay-loam
Average annual rainfall (mm) 1100 1300 690 783 1890
Main crops Cotton, Rice, Onion, Pasture, Rice,
grape, fruit sorghum, potato, pea vegetables sorghum,
trees cotton pasture
Year of transfer 1958-70 1949-51 1945 1970 1962-65
Period or year of construction 1990 1990 1992 1995 1996
WUA Asorut Asorecio Asusa Asochicamocha Asodimar
Heavy equipment (#) 27 20 2 6 26
*Water delivery efficiency is the ratio of volume delivered to volume diverted.
TABLE 2.
Farm size distribution in sample districts.
Percentage of farm holdings in each size range
Farm size range (ha) RUT Rio Recio Samacá San Rafael Maria La Baja
<5 75 14 95 95 46
5.1—10 11 11 3 2 29
10.1—20 7 23 1 2 15
20.1—50 6 23 1 1 7
>50 1 29 0 0 37
The Five Sample Districts
Roldanillo-La Union-Toro (RUT)
The Roldanillo-La Union-Toro (RUT) irri-
gation district is located in the prosperous
Cauca valley and serves 9,700 hectares.
RUT was the first district to be transferred
in the national transfer program in Janu-
ary 1990. The WUA was organized at the
time of construction of the project, but
functioned only in an advisory capacity
until transfer, after which it became a gov-
erning body (table 3).
5 As part of the
government’s overall policy to eliminate
subsidies to the agriculture sector, the gov-
ernment halted its expenditures for O&M
in the scheme after transfer. Before transfer,
the subsidy was approximately 60 to 80
percent of total costs. Since the scheme
had been rehabilitated before transfer, no
arrangements were made for further re-
pairs as part of the transfer process, except
for some minor repairs to the main canal.
After transfer, farmers began to realize that
they had seriously underestimated pump-
ing costs without a subsidy. They have
since pressured the government to provide
a temporary subsidy of approximately
US$800,000 for energy costs. No training
was provided as part of the transfer
process.
5Information for tables




ment staff, as well as
from INAT officials.
TABLE 3.
Occurrence of transfer activities in sample districts.
Transfer activity RUT Rio Recio Samacá San Rafael Maria La
Baja
Establish WUA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Train stet farmer representatives No No No Limited Limited
Train stet management staff No No No Yes Limited
Revise O&M procedures and/or No No No Yes Yes
plans
Revise water charges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reduce or eliminate govt. financing Fully Fully Fully Partly Partly
Remove some government staff Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Repair or improve intake and/or Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
main canals (major) (major) (after IMT)
Repair or improvement of No Yes Yes No Yes
subsidiary network (major) (major)
Did farmers help prioritize No No No Limited Limited
improvements?
Farmer investment in No No No No No
improvements?
Future responsibility for rehabilitation No No No Yes Yes
known?8
Rio Recio
The Rio Recio district is located in the
Tolima valley in central Colombia. It irri-
gates 10,200 hectares of farmland. Rio
Recio was transferred to the WUA
(ASORECIO) in January 1990, under the
principle of delegation of administration
wherein the government agency HIMAT
continued to exercise guidance over the
district for budgets, O&M plans, and per-
sonnel.
6 The water users favored transfer
mainly because they perceived that some
of the funds from the water charge were
being diverted to HIMAT budgets at state
and central levels. They felt they could
manage the system at a cost lower than
that of the government. As part of the ne-
gotiations for a transfer agreement, the us-
ers successfully lobbied to reduce the
number of staff after transfer and avoid re-
paying the cost of rehabilitation done prior
to transfer (which cost the government
US$3.6 million). Farmers had not partici-
pated in the rehabilitation and resisted at-
tempts by the government to recover the
costs from them. However, several mem-
bers of the staff were retained by the WUA
after transfer. Consequently, there was no
training or change in basic O&M proce-
dures associated with the transfer (table 3).
Samacá
The Samacá irrigation district is located in
Boyaca State, northeast of Bogota. It has a
service area of 3,000 hectares. In Samacá,
negotiations for transfer began in 1991
and culminated in October 1992 with the
official transfer. As part of a strategy to
make the district financially self-reliant by
the time of transfer, in 1991, the govern-
ment raised the fixed area water fee by 170
percent while abolishing the volumetric fee
(mainly due to difficulties of measuring
water delivered to the farm level). The
farmers’ main interests in transfer were to
reduce management costs and improve re-
sponsiveness of district management staff
to the farmers’ diverse irrigation needs.
Minor repairs were made in the main ca-
nal and subsidiary network prior to trans-
fer, but farmers did not participate in the
improvements (table 3). Government ex-
penditures for O&M were discontinued af-
ter transfer.
San Rafael
San Rafael district is a small river lift
scheme built in 1970. It irrigates 560 hect-
ares of land located in the mountainous
Boyaca State. Recently, the district has
been incorporated into the larger
Chicamocha irrigation district that is cur-
rently under development. San Rafael is
the first, and still the only unit in the
larger district to be functional. The WUA
for the larger Chicamocha district was or-
ganized in 1995, and at the end of the
year the district as a whole (including San
Rafael) was officially transferred to the
WUA. As part of the transfer negotiations,
INAT agreed to only gradually discontinue
subsidies over 3 to 5 years after transfer.
At the request of farmer representatives,
INAT also agreed to repair the pump sta-
tion and to transfer farm and heavy equip-
ment to the WUA at no cost to the water
users. The WUA also successfully lobbied
for the right to keep revenues obtained
from the sale of water to a beer factory and
tourist center nearby. Training in pump
operation was given to the WUA during
the transfer process.
6As with RUT, this over-
sight role continued un-




The Maria La Baja irrigation district is lo-
cated 50 km south of Cartagena City near
the Atlantic coast. Its current service area
is 9,260 hectares. In June 1994, INAT and
the WUA for the Maria La Baja district
(ASODIMAR) signed a consessional con-
tract. However, due to reluctance by water
users and INAT, the actual transfer did
not occur until the end of 1996. Farmers
complained that many of the structures
were dilapidated and should be repaired
before the system was handed over to the
WUA. INAT had reservations about the
perceived weak managerial capacity of the
WUA. Hence, it was agreed that INAT
would continue to jointly manage the dis-
trict with the WUA for at least 6 months
after the transfer, with a possible exten-
sion.
 This period of joint management was
extended to a full year, and was imple-
mented in 1997, when extensive training
was provided to district staff. Following
the period of joint management, the WUA
would take over full control of water
charges, budgeting, and O&M plans. It
was also agreed that a modest amount of
rehabilitation of broken-down structures
would be done after transfer and that the
WUA would have a role in prioritizing
what should be repaired. However,  which
party will be responsible to finance the




Table 4 summarizes powers devolved and
functions transferred to WUAs in the
sample districts. In all cases, the WUA is
a legally recognized entity with authority
to manage water diverted to a defined ser-
vice area. The WUA is a nonprofit, quasi-
municipal entity with legal rights of way
for irrigation canals and structures. The
association has the right to select its lead-
ers, make rules, and impose sanctions—up
to the maximum penalty of fines for dam-
ages to property, cessation of the water ser-
vice, and taking the violator to court.
Each WUA consists of a general assem-
bly of members and an elected board of di-
rectors. WUA members are all landowners
holding land within the command area,
whether irrigated or not. A general assem-
bly of members meets at least once a year
to reelect board members and approve poli-
cies. The boards have 7 normal members
plus alternate members. Board members
are elected for a renewable term of 2 years.
Before transfer, there was a fixed quota
system wherein 4 board members had to
be “small holders” whose total farm hold-
ings in the district were less than 20 hect-
ares each, and 3 members had to be “large
holders” whose total farm holdings in the
district were 20 hectares or more each.
Both RUT and Rio Recio districts abol-
ished this rule because farmers felt it was
arbitrary and exacerbated rather than less-
ened tensions among WUA members. Key
informants reported no severe social ten-
sions among farmers of differing classes,
landholding sizes, and wealth that would
restrict farmers to organize collectively.
Corruption and misallocation of water oc-
cur occasionally, but most farmers inter-
viewed indicated that this was not a per-
vasive problem and was related to a few
individuals rather than classes.
As mentioned, the first transfers did
not convey full control over district bud-
gets, O&M plans, water fees, and person-
nel. However, these powers were finally
vested in the WUA after the implementa-
tion of the Land Development Law of10
TABLE 4.
Powers devolved and functions transferred in sample districts.
Arrangements and functions RUT Rio Recio Samacá San Rafael Maria La Baja
Year of transfer 1990 1990 1992 1995 1996
WUA is legal entity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WUA leaders selected by Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
farmers
WUA has authority to make Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
rules and sanctions
Maximum sanction available to Fine, stop Fine, stop Fine, stop Fine, stop Fine, stop
WUA service, take service, take service, take service, take service, take
user to court user to court user to court user to court user to court
Maximum sanction applied Take user to Stop service Fine Stop service Not yet
since transfer court
Authority to make O&M plan Shared with Shared with Shared with Yes Yes
and budget* agency agency agency
Authority to set water charges* Shared with Shared with Shared with Yes Yes
agency agency agency
Authority to hire or release Not initially Not initially Not initially Yes Yes
management staff*
Legal water right at level of No No No No No
scheme or farmer organization
Control over intake Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control over main canal Yes Yes Yes Yes Not initially
system
Control over subsidiary canal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
system
Responsibility for future Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined
rehabilitation
Canal rights of way Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Right to make contracts and Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
raise additional revenue, not for
profit
WUA has right to make profits** No No No No No
*    After 1993 requirement for agency oversight was discontinued.
**  This issue is currently under consideration.11
1993, which was enacted in 1994. Colom-
bia has no distinct water law and there
are no water rights or concessions vested
in the districts or with individual farmers.
Expectations about water entitlements to
irrigation districts are based on precedents
about maximum seasonal divertable dis-
charges that have been specified by INAT
and previous irrigation administrations.
In many cases, especially in water-abun-
dant areas, or where there is only one di-
version weir along a river, no specified ceil-
ings exist. When a district is transferred to
a WUA, it takes over full control of the ir-
rigation network, including the intake. The
WUA has the right to make contracts with
third parties and raise supplemental rev-
enue apart from water charges. Although
the issue is currently under consideration,
WUAs are still prohibited from making
profits.
Managerial Changes Made by
WUAs after Transfer
At the heart of the theory of management devo-
lution is the argument that, local users of a
resource who are empowered as a group
to take over management of the resource
have the incentive to manage the resource
more efficiently and sustainably than a
centrally financed government agency. The
vital element between adoption of transfer
and realization of impacts is the matter of
changes in management by the WUA:
What actual managerial changes, if any,
are made by the WUA after transfer? What
are the primary motivations for the
changes—to reduce costs, improve effi-
ciency or reliability of management, or to
enhance the productivity or profitability of
irrigated agriculture?
Table 5 identifies changes in manage-
ment practices by WUAs in RUT, Rio
Recio, and Samacá districts following man-
agement transfer.
7 Enhancement of effi-
ciency (especially cost reduction) was the
dominant motivation for changes intro-
duced in the three districts. This concern
prompted such actions as streamlining or-
ganizational structure, merging or abolish-
ing positions, reducing staff, increasing
work hours and service areas, streamlining
procedures for fee payment, and introduc-
ing computerized management informa-
tion systems.
Table 6 displays information on
district staff deployment before and after
transfer in the five districts. Three years
after transfer, the WUA management
reduced the number of staff in RUT, Rio
Recio, and Samacá by 20–60 percent.
Post-transfer service area per staff ranged
from 124 hectares for RUT (a 2-stage lift
system) to 298 hectares in Samacá.
Other significant actions taken by the
WUAs included replacing old “inherited”
ditch tenders with new ones (who were
expected to be more accountable to the
new WUA management). Supervision of
operations was decentralized into zones.
The districts began making structural re-
pairs at their own expense (reportedly in
more pragmatic and cost-efficient ways
than had been done by public agencies be-
fore transfer).  The districts also began to
diversify their revenue sources and hired
lawyers to collect overdue fee payments.
These actions were intended to improve
accountability and competence of staff,
management efficiency, financial solvency
of the district, and reliability of water de-
livery. There is some question about the
willingness of farmers to invest in the
long-term sustainability of the irrigation
schemes in that, after transfer, no district
has yet initiated an infrastructure replace-
ment and improvement fund.
8 Farmers in-
dicated some unease about an accumula-
7San Rafael and Maria
La Baja are not includ-
ed here because at the
time of this study not
enough time had tran-




ferred in the 1990s, RUT
was the only one that es-
tablished an equipment
replacement fund. Coel-
lo and Saldaña, trans-
ferred in 1976, also set
up such funds after
transfer. However, no
districts in the country
have set up a capital-re-




Changes in management made by WUAs after transfer.
Type of change RUT Rio Recio Samacá Primary motivation
Streamlined organizational structure Yes Yes Yes Efficiency
General manager and board president Yes Yes Efficiency
positions merged
Small/large farmer board quotas eliminated Yes Yes Reduce tensions
Replaced ditch tenders with new recruits Yes Accountability
Reduced total number of staff Yes Yes Yes Efficiency
Staff work hours increased and made Yes Yes Yes Efficiency
flexible
Obtained limited training/consultation from Yes Yes Yes Staff competence
agency
Obtained limited training/consultation from Yes Yes Yes Staff competence
third party
Hired lawyer to recover overdue water fee Yes Yes Yes Financial solvency,
payments accountability
Streamlined fee payment arrangements Yes Yes Yes Convenience, efficiency
Eliminated volumetric fee Yes Efficiency
Diversified revenue sources Yes Yes Financial solvency
Established capital replacement fund for Yes Financial solvency
heavy equipment
Sponsored improvements in canal network Yes Yes Reliability of water
delivery
Established water management zones in Yes Accountability,
scheme efficiency
Introduced MIS programs for administration Yes Yes Yes Efficiency,
and finance accountability
TABLE 6.
Deployment of district management staff.
Total district staff Service area per staff
District Before transfer After transfer Before transfer After transfer
RUT 92 78 105.4 124.3
Rio Recio 114 48 88.6 210.4
Samacá 13 10 229.3 298.1
San Rafael 5 5 118.0 118.0
Maria La Baja 94 92 98.5 100.6
Note:  ‘After transfer data' for RUT, Rio Recio, and Samacá were taken 3 years after transfer. ‘After transfer data'
for San Rafael were taken 19 months after transfer, and for Maria La Baja only 8 months after transfer.13
tion of a large amount of money in a long-
term account and many expected the gov-
ernment to finance most, if not all, of the
future costs of rehabilitation.
As indicated in figure 2 (charts 2.5
and 2.6), except in Maria La Baja, the ma-
jority of farmers interviewed felt that over-
all administration of the district was good
both before and after transfer. In RUT,
Samacá, and San Rafael, 25 to 35 percent
felt it had improved after transfer. More
than half the farmers in Maria La Baja felt
district administration was poor before
and after transfer. In RUT, farmers were
evenly split on whether communication
between farmers and district staff was ef-
fective or not. In the other districts, most
farmers reported a negative perception
about farmer/district staff communication
both before and after transfer, or that it had
worsened (e.g., Rio Recio).
9In Samacá, the govern-
ment began expenditure
reduction before the
1992 transfer, as part of
the national policy
adopted in 1990 to re-
duce expenditures and
transfer management.
10This includes the cost
of a hydroelectric ener-
gy station in addition to
irrigation system costs.
It was not possible to




The primary interest of the government for
promoting management transfer was to
decrease government expenditures for the
recurring costs of irrigation. In the short
run, management transfer has reduced
government expenditures in the sample
districts dramatically. As indicated in fig-
ure 3, government expenditures per hectare
fell from a range of US$20–US$80 per hect-
are before transfer to zero or near zero af-
ter transfer in the RUT, Rio Recio, and
Samacá districts.
9 During the same period
(1985–95) government expenditures in San
Rafael (the lift scheme that was only
transferred in 1995) rose during its
development stage all the way to US$200–
US$250 per hectare and have remained at
this high level to date.
10 While expendi-
tures for routine management costs have
been eliminated or reduced substantially, it
is not yet clear how much money the
government might provide to the districts
for rehabilitation in the future. If after
transfer WUAs begin to defer maintenance
in anticipation of future government
assistance for rehabilitation, it is possible
that government expenditures for rehabili-
tation could increase over time.
Transfer resulted in variable effects on
the cost of irrigation to farmers. In RUT,
where the total cost of irrigation was
relatively high (due to two-stage pump-
ing), at transfer, farmers exerted pressure
on their new board to contain costs. Over
6 years after transfer, total farmer pay-
ments declined in real terms by 22
percent, from US$83 to US$65 per hectare
by 1995. This was due to both a decline in
fee-collection rate, from above 90 percent
before transfer to less than 70 percent by
1995 (figure 4 and table 7) and a reduction
in the amount of water delivered per hect-
are (figure 5). Owing to the elimination of
the government subsidy and declining
farmer payments of water charges, the
board was pressured to increase the water
charge and reduce the budget in an effort
to balance finances. The water charge was
increased from US$67 per hectare in 1990
(year of transfer) to US$108 in 1995
(table 8) while the total O&M budget was
cut by 42 percent between 1989 and 1995
(table 7). However, these efforts were insuf-
ficient due to underfinanced maintenance
and lobbying from farmers. By 1995, the
government again began paying for some
of the cost of repair work.14
FIGURE 2.
Farmer perceptions about district performance before and after turnover.
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2.6. Effectiveness of communications.
Note: Both=Both before and after (e.g., Both adequate = Adequate, both before and after).1
5
FIGURE 3.
Cost of irrigation to the government and the farmers.
* Cost to the government = Funds spent, which originated from government sources other than the district.
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FIGURE 4.
Irrigation fee collection rates.
TABLE 7.
Key performance indicators for sample districts, before and after management transfer.
RUT Rio Recio Samacá San Rafael
1989 1995 1989 1995 1989 1995 1989 1995
Relative water supply* ratio 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.1 1.4 1.6 1 1.1
Relative irrigation supply ratio 2 1.1 3.3 3.7 1.5 1.8 0.6 0.9
Water delivery capacity ratio 1.6 2.5 2.3 2.2 1.2 1.7 na na
Capacity utilization rate ratio 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 na na
Irrigation intensity % 154 153 142 114 106 149 197 190
GVO/Unit land* US$/ha 2,013 2,060 (1994) 2,155 2,112 (1994) 10,394 9,060 1,568 (1991) 1,808
GVO/Unit water* US$/m3 0.54 0.91 0.17 0.17 1.2 2.06 1.08 1.56
Fee collection rate % 82 67 na na 80 72 94 95
Financial self-sufficiency* % 51 69 19.4 114.9 29 107 21.2 52.8
Return on investment* % 25 33 31 29 12 22 24 28
O&M/Unit land US$/ha 163 95 38 54 111 61 180 256
O&M/Unit water US$/1,000m3 23 29 2 2 7 8 62 176
* These belong to IWMI’s standard minimum set of performance indicators (IIMI 1996).1
7
FIGURE 5.
Relative water supply (RWS) and relative irrigation supply (RIS) in sample districts.




























































































































































Water charges in sample districts before and after transfer.
District Area water charge Volumetric water charge Total water charge
(US$/ha) (US$/1,000m3) (US$/ha)
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995
Samacá 14.8 35.5 2.3 ** 23 36
Rio Recio 12.9 12.6 1.3 1.3 66 Pending
RUT 40.7 65.7 6.8 9.3 67 108
San Rafael 18.1 26.6 10.4 17.5 48 53
Maria La Baja 14.3 16.4 2.7 2.2 53 55
In Samacá, where total O&M costs
were at the modest level of about US$20–
US$25 per hectare, and where government
subsidies were eliminated completely, the
cost of irrigation to farmers rose substan-
tially after transfer. However, the new
board kept total O&M budgets at about the
same level after transfer. In Rio Recio, the
district was able to achieve financial self-
sufficiency rapidly after transfer without
raising its fees (which were nearly as high
as in RUT, although it had no pumping
costs). The district achieved this through
increasing fee collections dramatically and
avoiding increases in the O&M budget af-
ter transfer. Although San Rafael was not
transferred until 1995, a trend of declining
government expenditures and rising costs
to farmers occurred from the late 1980s to
the early 1990s. The district has not had
trouble with fee collections from farmers,
despite their extraordinarily high levels.
This is largely because it is a pump
scheme and water is not delivered to indi-
vidual farms if payments by the respective
farmer are in arrears.
The total cost of irrigation, or the total
annual O&M budget, did not increase sig-
nificantly during the first few years after
transfer in any of the schemes in the study.
Figure 6 shows that the self-sufficiency of
fee levels (relative to O&M budgets) rose to
approximately 100 percent at transfer in
RUT and Samacá, mainly due to drops in
the O&M budgets (which were followed
by slight rising trends after transfer). This
was followed by worrisome declines in ir-
rigation fee collection rates over several
years after transfer (figure 4). By 1995, fees
collected had dropped back down to only
69 percent of the O&M budget (table 7). In
Rio Recio, the O&M budget remained at
virtually the same level for several years
after transfer, although the fee level
adequacy rose abruptly after transfer.
This suggests that most of the additional




O&M budgets and financial self-sufficiency.
Rio Recio
198519861987198819891990199119921993199419951996




























































































































In the high-cost RUT district, the bud-
get dropped abruptly in the year of trans-
fer from about US$163 per hectare in 1989
to US$95 per hectare in 1995. The abrupt
budget cut was apparently not sustainable;
as is also indicated by the just one-time
rise in self-sufficiency of fees collected. Af-
ter this, the budget again began to rise and
self-sufficiency to fall. By 1995, only 69
percent of RUT’s budget was mobilized
from fees, while the government again be-
gan providing financial assistance to the
district.
Samacá had no trouble collecting
enough fees to cover its total budget after
transfer. In this sample, the gravity flow
schemes were able to sustain financial sol-
vency for the first 5 years after transfer,
even where substantial increases in fees
were required. But neither of the high-cost
pump schemes (RUT and San Rafael) was
financially solvent either before or after
transfer.
Figure 2 (chart 2.4) shows data on
farmer perceptions about financial man-
agement of the districts before and after
transfer. Except for Maria La Baja, the
most common view among farmers was
that financial management of the district
was handled satisfactorily both before and
after transfer. However, a significant minor-
ity of 10–25 percent had negative views. In
all cases, the majority perception was that
transfer has not brought about a signifi-
cant change in the quality of financial
management of the districts. Data in figure
4 indicate declining irrigation fee collection
rates in RUT and Samacá, which is an un-
expected cause for concern. It suggests that
the new farmer organizations lack ad-
equate support from farmers.
Table 7 summarizes data on these fi-
nancial and other performance indicators,
before and after transfer. The financial self-
sufficiency of fees collected to cover O&M
budgets increased dramatically in all cases
(even San Rafael which was not turned
over), except RUT, which declined by al-
most 40 percent. The decline in RUT is ap-
parently attributable to its high cost and
sudden loss of substantial subsidies from
the government. Following transfer, expen-
ditures for O&M in high-cost RUT and
Samacá were cut substantially while, for
low-cost Rio Recio they increased signifi-
cantly. O&M expenditures (by the govern-
ment) in high-cost San Rafael increased
further even before it was transferred to the
users.
Quality of Operations
Monthly water balance data for the
four sample schemes are presented in fig-
ure 7. The irrigation requirement (shown
as hanging bars) is the difference between
effective rainfall and evapotranspiration.
In all the four sample districts there are
two marked rainfall periods during the
year. In RUT and Samacá, irrigation is re-
quired to supplement effective rainfall in
nearly every month of the year (except No-
vember in Samacá). In Rio Recio, irrigation
is required only 8 months of the year. No
irrigation is required during the rainy pe-
riods of April–May and October–Novem-
ber. In all districts, irrigation is supplemen-
tal to cover frequent and sometimes
lengthy dry periods.
Figure 5 and table 7 present annual
data on Relative Water Supply (RWS),
Relative Irrigation Supply (RIS), and total
precipitation.
11 RUT and Rio Recio have
relatively abundant water supplies in rela-
tion to crop water requirements. Since RUT
is a pump scheme, RWS and RIS values
which are above 2.0 suggest poor manage-
ment in that they are pumping more than
what is required for irrigation. Prior to
11RWS is the sum of  ir-
rigation supply (IS) and
total rainfall (TR) divid-
ed by crop water re-
quirement (CWR), i.e.,
RWS = (IS + TR)/CWR.
RIS is irrigation supply
(IS) divided by the dif-
ference between crop
water requirement
(CWR)  and effective
rainfall (ER), i.e., RIS =
IS/(CWR-ER).21
FIGURE 7.
Average monthly water balance in sample districts.
Continued22
FIGURE 7. (Continued)23
transfer, farmers had got used to an on-de-
mand system of ordering water and this
continued after transfer, despite the high
costs involved and the inefficiencies of this
delivery system. However, after transfer,
RIS has been on a declining trend as the
new management has attempted to reduce
the amount of water pumped.
In Rio Recio, RWS and RIS values
above 3.0 also indicate that the manage-
ment is diverting water far above crop wa-
ter requirements, leading to greater ineffi-
ciencies. However, since it is a run-of-the-
river scheme and there are no other users
downstream, there is little incentive for the
district to divert less water. But, given that
Rio Recio has the opportunity to sell wa-
ter for energy generation, the high RWS
and RIS values are indications of high op-
portunity costs. RWS and RIS have contin-
ued to rise even after transfer.
From just before transfer in 1992 until
1996, RWS and RIS values for Samacá
have been roughly within what can be
considered an ideal level of approximately
1.5. This did not change after transfer. The
low values for RWS and RIS for San Rafael
indicate that farmers have been unwilling
to pump unless it was absolutely neces-
sary, given the high costs. Also, the pre-
dominant crop is pasture, which is more
resistant to dry periods than crops grown
in the other districts. However, values less
than one indicate that the crops are being
grown under stress and yields could be
affected. While it makes good sense of
management to keep pumping costs down,
this should not be done at the cost of crop
yields.
No significant changes in RWS or RIS
were observed in Samacá or San Rafael af-
ter transfer. The significant decline in RIS
in RUT after transfer is explained mainly
by the high cost of pumping and the de-
clining financial situation due to elimina-
tion of government subsidies and declin-
ing revenues from water charges. Increase
in RWS in Rio Recio after transfer is ap-
parently more related to above-average lev-
els of rainfall after transfer than to the
transfer itself.
Another measure of operational perfor-
mance is the Capacity Utilization Ratio
(CUR), expressed as a ratio of the annual
peak demand for irrigation to the maxi-
mum canal carrying capacity. It is an indi-
cator of the extent to which canal delivery
capacity is being availed. Data for RUT
(shown in figure 8 and table 7) show a
gradual improvement from 1986 through
1993, at which time the CUR reached
1.25.
12 The rise was related to shifts to
crops with higher water requirements. The
decline after 1993 was apparently due to
the decline in RIS in recent years, brought
about the financial crisis mentioned
above. Samacá also had a rising trend (fig-
ure 8) over time that reversed at transfer
and stabilized at a moderate level of about
0.6.
13
Figure 9 shows the data on trends in
irrigation intensity in the sample districts.
San Rafael has the consistently highest in-
tensity due to its production of pasture
that has grown through both cultivation
seasons. Intensities increased to the range
of 150–170 percent in both RUT (mainly
because of increasing the area planted
with sugarcane) and Samacá (mainly due
to increasing the area planted with mul-
tiple crops of onion). But in both cases, the
increases began before transfer and can-
not, therefore be attributed primarily to
management changes brought about by
transfer. Rio Recio has had a steady de-
cline in irrigation intensity over the entire
period, from 160 percent to 115 percent.
This is related to a general shift from
flooded rice to cotton, sorghum, and other
crops. The decline in irrigation intensity
12Peak demand exceed-
ed maximum capacity
in 1993 (with a CUR of
1.25). This happens
when farmers establish
a cropping pattern over
an area such that the ir-
rigation requirement ex-
ceeds what can ade-
quately be served with
the available canal ca-
pacity. In this situation
rotational deliveries
could be arranged and/
or the delivered flow
may temporarily en-
croach on canal free-
board.
13This was also appar-
ently related to shifts in
crop choices as noted in
the section entitled “Im-
pacts on Productivity”
p28.24
despite high RWS and RIS is an indication
of poor water management, which has
continued to worsen after transfer. This
statement is supported by the trend in val-
ues of both water- and agriculture-related
indicators, for this system.
FIGURE 8.
Capacity utilization ratio in sample districts.25
FIGURE 9.
Annual irrigation intensity in sample districts.
14 A functional structure
is defined as one that
can currently perform
its basic design function
and shows no signs of
losing this capacity
within about a year.  A
nearly dysfunctional
structure is one that is
considered to be likely
to become unable to per-
form its basic function
within about one year’s
time.  A dysfunctional
structure is one that was
unable to perform its
basic function at the
time of the inspection.
For canal reaches, dys-
functional means it is
unable to convey at least
70 percent of the desired
flow capacity. Nearly
dysfunctional means it
is likely to become dys-
functional within about
one year’s time.
Figure 2 (charts 2.1 and 2.2) shows
that the majority of farmers interviewed in
RUT, Rio Recio, and San Rafael felt that
water delivered was both adequate and
fairly distributed before and after transfer.
Farmers in Samacá are divided between
the positive and negative views of water
adequacy and fairness of distribution. This
is mainly due to the bifurcated and elon-
gated structure of the system between the
hillsides and valley floor and water-scarce
conditions in Samacá.
We hypothesized that the proportion
of farmers who perceive change in perfor-
mance before and after IMT (or the refer-
ence year for nontransferred schemes)
would be different between transferred
and nontransferred districts. This was
disconfirmed at the 95 percent level of
probability with the Pearson Chi-square
test (X
2), for the three indicators of:
1. Farmer perceptions about adequacy of
water delivered to the farm
(X
2=0.0003),
2. Adequacy of system maintenance
(X
2=3.65), and
3. Fairness of water distribution
(X
2=3.76).
Our conclusion is that management
transfer by itself did not bring about any
clear and significant changes in the qual-
ity of irrigation operations in the study
schemes.
Impacts on Sustainability of Infrastructure
A detailed field inspection was made of
canal lengths and structures in the RUT,
Rio Recio, Samacá, San Rafael, and Maria
La Baja schemes. The study team in-
spected sample canal lengths randomly
selected within upper, lower, and tail
strata along main, branch, and distributary
canals. All control and measurement
structures along the sample lengths were
inspected. Canal reaches and structures
were classified as ‘functional’ (F), ‘nearly
dysfunctional’ (ND), and ‘dysfunctional’
(D).
14 Canal lengths were considered ‘de-
fective’ if one of the following problems ex-
isted and if it interfered with the desired
hydraulic operation—
Note: T-5 is 5 years before transfer.  T is the year of transfer.  T+5 is 5 years after transfer.26
• constriction or enlargement of the ca-
nal cross section
• visible siltation and/or encroachment
of freeboard or adjacent road
• visible seepage
• slippage, scouring, or other defects in
the embankment
• cracks or other damage to canal lining
Table 9 displays the percentage of to-
tal canal length inspected in each scheme
that was observed to be dysfunctional,
nearly dysfunctional, and functional. Ex-
cept for Maria La Baja (which had numer-
ous design and construction problems and
was undergoing rehabilitation at the time
of the study), dysfunctional canal lengths
were rare. Nearly dysfunctional sections
were found along 10 percent to 19 percent
of observed canal lengths.
TABLE 9.
Functional condition of structures inspected.
District Total structures Structures Dysfnctional Nearly dys- Functional
in scheme inspected (%) (%) functional (%) (%)
RUT 80 50 4 14 82
Rio Recio 234 17 0 3 97
Samacá 525 60 11 28 62
San Rafael* 40 25 0 12 88
Maria La Baja** 250 22 52 30 18
* Network inspected was drainage network. San Rafael has no surface irrigation canals.
** Some canals inspected are already under rehabilitation as part of the IMT process.
Control, conveyance, measurement,
and ancillary structures were considered
defective (i.e., dysfunctional or nearly dys-
functional), if one of the following condi-
tions was present:·
• Scouring of canal adjacent to the
structure.
• The approach section, rubble pack, or
wings of structures are breaking apart.
• The water control structure cannot
control flow as intended (due to gates
or sills missing, eroded, or damaged;
significant leakage at gates; or damaged
mechanism of movable structures).
• The water measurement structure
cannot be used to measure flow due to
a damaged or missing gauge, recorder,
or other component.
• The civil works of ancillary structures
are damaged or poorly constructed.
Table 10 shows the number of struc-
tures inspected that were found to be dys-
functional, nearly dysfunctional, and func-
tional. Again, Maria La Baja was in poor
condition with 82 percent of observed
structures being either dysfunctional or
nearly so. This clarifies why the farmers
have resisted transfer and insisted that the
scheme be rehabilitated before transfer.
Samacá is problematic with only 62 per-
cent of observed structures being fully
functional. Figure 10 shows that most of
the dysfunctional structures in Samacá
are adjustable gates (many are missing or
damaged) and division boxes (many with
broken sills or walls).27
TABLE 10.
Functional condition of canal lengths inspected.
District  Total canal Length Length dys- Length nearly Length func-
network length inspected (%) functional (%)  dysfunctional (%) tional (%)
RUT 170.7 10 0 17 83
Rio Recio 135.8 12 0 10 90
Samacá 58.0 28 6 19 75
San Rafael* 30.0 15 3 12 85
Maria La Baja** 284.7 13 19 19 62
* Network inspected was drainage network. San Rafael has no surface irrigation canals.
** Some canals inspected are already under rehabilitation, as part of the IMT process.
The study team working together with
maintenance staff of the Irrigation Depart-
ment also estimated the cost using local
materials and labor to repair all canal
lengths and structures that were identified
as dysfunctional or nearly dysfunctional.
In table 11, the cost estimate for repairing
all dysfunctional canal lengths and struc-
tures is referred to as the accumulated essential
maintenance requirement (row 2). The cost esti-
mate for repairing all defective canal
lengths and structures is referred to as the
accumulated preventive maintenance requirement
(row 3). The combination of the two is
termed the total accumulated or deferred
maintenance requirement  (row 4), which means
maintenance problems that have been de-
ferred from routine maintenance.
If we add routine and accumulated
maintenance requirements together (row 5)
and compare this to routine expenditure,
we have a value which is the percentage
by which routine expenditure would have
to increase to take care of all routine, es-
sential, and preventive maintenance re-
quirements within 3 years (row 6). Clearly,
the lower the value, the greater the
organization’s ability to handle current
maintenance requirements without exter-
nal subsidies.
FIGURE 10.
Distribution of dysfunctional structures by type, Samaca irrigation system.28
TABLE 11.
Maintenance investment capacity in transferred districts.
Maintenance expenditures and requirements RUT Rio Recio Samacá
(1995 US$ per ha)
1 Current average annual maintenance expenditure (US$ per ha) 38.18 25.45 19.12
2 Accumulated essential maintenance requirement (US$ per ha)     0.46          0     3.01
3 Accumulated preventive maintenance requirement (US$ per ha)     0.91     1.01     3.42
4 Total accumulated or deferred maintenance  1.36     1.01     6.43
requirement (US$ per ha)
5 MIC Index  (item 1/item 4)   28.10   24.95     2.97
6 Total annual maintenance expenditure required to do routine
maintenance plus complete essential maintenance in 1 year and 38.95 27.97 23.27
preventive maintenance in 3 years (US$ per ha)
7 Increase of item 6 over item 1 (%)     2.0     1.3   21.7
15However, in RUT the
inspection did not in-
clude the condition of
pump stations, which
could represent a signif-









To eliminate deferred maintenance re-
quirements within 3 years RUT and Rio
Recio would only have to raise the average
maintenance budget by 2 percent and 1.3
percent, respectively. This is quite reason-
able and we conclude that maintenance
appears to be sustainable in these schemes
from the aspect of resource mobilization.
15
However, in Samacá, the situation is
more problematic. The district would have
to increase its maintenance budget by 21.7
percent to eliminate the accumulated main-
tenance requirement within 3 years. In
theory, this could be achieved either by in-
creasing the fee collection rate above its
current level of 70 percent, or by increas-
ing the fee per hectare, or both. The district
had already increased its water charges by
56 percent between 1990 and 1995. Even
with an additional increase in the water
fee, the fee will still be significantly lower
than in the other districts. However, there
is cause for concern about whether the dis-
trict will be able to raise the budget by a
further 21.7 percent to eliminate the back-
log since the fee collection rate has been on
a declining trend after transfer—from 80
percent in 1993 to 70 percent in 1996 (fig-
ure 4). An increase in the fee collection rate
could lead to a further decline in the col-
lection rate.
Figure 2 (chart 2.3) shows that most
farmers in RUT and Rio Recio perceived
maintenance to be adequate before and af-
ter transfer. Positive farmer perceptions in
RUT and Rio Recio, and more divided
perceptions in Samacá, correspond gener-
ally with the results of the scheme inspec-
tions. Farmers in Maria La Baja are very
dissatisfied with canal maintenance for
reasons mentioned above. With the excep-
tion of Maria La Baja, and some concern
about Samacá, we can conclude that most
of the schemes transferred appear to be
physically sustainable, assuming moderate




Changes in management practices and fi-
nancial status of irrigation districts can be
considered as direct outcomes of manage-
ment transfer. These, in turn, could be ex-
pected to have effects on the quality of op-
erations and maintenance. Changes in the
quality of operations and maintenance29
could, in turn, effect the agricultural and
economic productivity of irrigation
schemes.
We have seen that, with the apparent
exception of RUT, transfer did not result in
significant changes in the quality of opera-
tions and it appears doubtful that it had
much effect on maintenance, as levels of
maintenance investment have not deterio-
rated (according to farmer reports). Hence,
except for RUT, we would not expect to
find significant changes in agricultural or
economic productivity that could be attrib-
uted to management transfer.
Figure 9 shows that only one scheme
(RUT) had significant improvement in
cropping intensity at the time of transfer
and afterwards. The cropping intensity
rose from 110 percent to 160–170 percent
after transfer. The increase is attributable to
a shift to sugarcane production (which is
in the ground year-round), perennial
grape, and tree crops. However, soybean
yields (one of the major crops) remained
constant before and after transfer (figure
11). Also in RUT, gross value of output
(GVO) per unit of land did not change sig-
nificantly after transfer (figure 12). The
post-transfer improvement in value of out-
put per unit of water in RUT is attributable
to the decline in RIS (as referred to above)
and it appears that the decline in RIS is
related to financial pressures induced by
transfer.
In Samacá, irrigation intensity and po-
tato yields (figures 9 and 11) were on the
rise before transfer and reversed to a slight
downward trend afterwards. But this is
apparently more related to temporary dis-
turbances caused by significant shifts in
crop choices among farmers, rather than to
effects of management transfer. Substantial
drops in GVO per hectare and per cubic
meter followed by improvements after
transfer (figures 12 and 13) are apparently
attributable to temporary water balance
disturbances related to shifts by farmers to
higher-value commercial crops such as po-
tato and onion. After the volumetric fee
was discarded in Samacá in 1991, more
pasture and vegetable crops were grown
and there was a slight increase in the
amount of water diverted per hectare (fig-
ure 5). With the shift to higher value crops
which occurred just before management
transfer, the GVO per unit of land and wa-
ter reversed to a rising trend after transfer.
The discarding of the volumetric fee can
be linked to management transfer (in that,
it was the decision of the farmer assembly),
but changes in crop patterns towards
more onion and potato cannot be linked.
FIGURE 11.
Yields of major crops in sample districts.30
FIGURE 12.
Annual gross value of output per unit of land.
FIGURE 13.
Annual gross value of output per unit of water.31
Changes in the crop pattern in the
other districts do not appear to be related
to management transfer. Irrigation intensi-
ties have been on a long gradual decline in
Rio Recio since before transfer, but have
remained stable in San Rafael (which was
not transferred during the same period).
Between 1985 and 1995, main crop yields
(rice) in Rio Recio, which had been trans-
ferred, and San Rafael (pasture) and Maria
la Baja (rice), which were not transferred,
have all remained fairly stable (figure 11).
Figure 12 shows that GVO per unit of
land remained relatively stable after trans-
fer in RUT, Rio Recio, and San Rafael.
Samacá was the exception. Figure 13
shows that the GVO per unit of water
increased significantly in three of the
transferred schemes, including non- trans-
ferred San Rafael. In Rio Recio, although
rice has been gradually replaced by cotton
and other grains after transfer, the amount
of water diverted has not declined; hence,
GVO per unit of water has not improved.
As mentioned above, the increase in
GVO per unit of water in RUT after trans-
fer is due to a shift to higher value crops
such as sugarcane and smaller water or-
ders due to higher pumping costs. Mainly
due to financial pressures created by the
loss of government subsidies in RUT, and
reductions in volume of water delivered
per hectare after transfer, the district sig-
nificantly reduced its RIS ratio as well as
its GVO per unit of water pumped into the
main canals. In San Rafael, high pumping
costs similarly resulted in higher GVO per
unit of water delivered, but this cannot be
attributed to management transfer, since it
did not occur until 1995. So we conclude
that, except for RUT, management transfer
itself did not have significant impacts, ei-
ther positive or negative, on the agricul-
tural or economic productivity of the study
schemes.
Data are available on cost of irrigatio-
nas a percentage of gross value of output
for RUT, Rio Recio, and Samacá. In RUT,
the declining trend in this indicator is re-
lated to a decline in the RIS (as noted
above) and a decline in water fee collec-
tion rates after transfer. Cost of irrigation
relative to GVO rose gradually after trans-
fer in Rio Recio and Samacá (figure 14).
FIGURE 14.
Cost of irrigation as percentage of gross value of output.
Note: Based on per ha farmer costs and output, in 1995 US dollar equivalents.32
The national irrigation management trans-
fer program in Colombia adopted in 1990
can be characterized as a significant but
only partial devolution of management to
water users. The government maintained
considerable advisory influence over the
districts for several years, exercising some
control over O&M plans and budgets, and
resisting district attempts to release large
numbers of staff. After adoption of the
1993 Land Development Law, this control
was relaxed considerably and districts
gained almost complete control over O&M,
financial management, and disposition of
staff. However, powers devolved do not in-
clude a formal water right or ownership of
irrigation scheme infrastructure. Also, the
government has not made it clear as to
whose responsibility it will be, and under
what terms and conditions, to finance pos-
sible future costs of rehabilitation.
The findings of this study support the
hypothesis that management transfer leads
to efforts by the WUA to improve manage-
ment efficiency, such as reducing the num-
ber of management staff and taking mea-





Measures to improve cost efficiency High priority after transfer, several measures adopted
Measures to improve administration Majority of farmers report no change
and communications
Cost of irrigation to the government Significant reduction
Cost of irrigation to the farmers Upward trend, especially for pump schemes
Total cost of irrigation Mixed results, no clear pattern
Local financial self-sufficiency for O&M budget Increasing trend after transfer
Water distribution Mixed results. Planned improvements in relative irrigation supply
in 2 schemes. Majority of farmers report no changes in
adequacy or fairness of water distribution
Financial sustainability of infrastructure Three sample schemes OK. Two others have significant deferred
maintenance or construction problems. Costly pump schemes
are in doubt. No capital replacement funds set up
Functional condition of infrastructure Good in 3 schemes, problematic in 2 others
Agricultural productivity No significant changes
Economic productivity Mostly no change in GVO/ha. Improving trend in GVO/m3 water in 3
schemes (partly related to managerial improvements in RIS in 2 schemes)
Ratio of cost of irrigation to gross value of Mixed results
agricultural output33
In the short term, the government has
achieved its objectives of significant reduc-
tion of government expenditures for irriga-
tion management. In most cases, this has
resulted in a significant but not severe in-
crease to farmers in the cost of irrigation.
In most cases, total costs of O&M did not
change much after transfer. The general
conclusion regarding operations and main-
tenance is that management transfer did
not appear to bring about significant
changes in the quality of operations or
maintenance, that the transfer did not settle
problems, and that it did not interfere with
favorable management. Results of the
maintenance survey suggest that most
gravity flow, river diversion schemes that
were transferred in the early wave of the
reform appear to have the capacity to fi-
nance and carry out a sustainable mainte-
nance program.
Schemes transferred more recently tend
to have high management costs (such as
San Rafael) or dilapidated infrastructure
with high costs for repair (such as Maria
La Baja). This makes the prospect of local
sustainability for these schemes much
more problematic than those transferred in
the early wave of transfers. The financial
sustainability of pump schemes is in doubt
after the government abolished all energy
subsidies and farmers were forced to pay
the full cost of pumping water. Of the five
districts, only RUT established an equip-
ment-replacement fund. No district has set
up a capital-replacement fund for basic in-
frastructure. So there is cause for concern
about the willingness of the farmer-gov-
erned districts to invest in the long-term
sustainability of scheme infrastructure.
The sample districts did not show any
significant improvements in agricultural or
economic productivity that could be attrib-
uted to management transfer. In summary,
management transfer prompted a number
of managerial changes aimed at improving
management efficiency and staff account-
ability in the districts. Transfer resulted in
a significant shift in the burden of cost
from the government to farmers, which has
generally been accepted by farmers. But
transfer has not had substantial impacts
on the performance of operations and
maintenance, or on the agricultural and
economic productivity of irrigated land or
water—neither improving negative perfor-
mance nor causing detriment where per-
formance is positive.
The assumption is commonly made
that management devolution will lead to
improved performance of irrigation sys-
tems. But irrigation management transfer
is not a singular concept. There are a va-
riety of strategies worldwide that vary in
degree of authority transferred. In the case
of Colombia, management transfer was
significant but not complete. In the early
years, the government maintained consid-
erable authority over O&M plans, budgets,
and district staff. The government retains
ownership of infrastructure and is also re-
sponsible for financing future rehabilita-
tion and modernization of the schemes.
No water rights have been granted to the
districts or water users. Further compara-
tive research is needed to test the hypoth-
esis that a more integrated and compre-
hensive devolution policy would lead to
more positive impacts on performance.
This study provides evidence that irri-
gation management transfer does lead to
improve the efficiency and contain the cost
of management. This study suggests that
to be viable, local management should be
given full authority over O&M plans and
budgets, financial management, disposi-
tion of staff, and enforcement of sanctions.
The study lends credence to the argument
that consistent and integrated policy sup-
port is needed to induce farmers to invest34
in the long-term financial and physical
sustainability of irrigation systems. Ex-
amples of such kinds of support, which
are often lacking in management trans-
fer programs in many countries, are the
following:
• Clear policy about terms and condi-
tions whereby future subsidy or fi-
nancial assistance for rehabilitation,
or modernization of irrigation sys-
tems will be provided.
• Linkage of such a policy to some de-
gree of matching local investment,
development of a long-term capital
replacement fund by local manage-
ment, and implementation of main-
tenance according to agreed techni-
cal standards.
• Arrangements whereby the govern-
ment conducts technical audits of
maintenance and helps guarantee
the financial integrity of capital re-
placement funds.
• Involvement of farmer equity and
decision making in pre-transfer re-
pairs to engender a sense of local
ownership in the irrigation system.
• Adequate on-the-job training pro-
vided to new staff through at least
one or two full seasons prior to
transfer.
• Special arrangements to provide ex-
tra, but well-specified subsidies
(which phase out gradually) to lift
schemes which have high energy
costs.
• A program to develop a post-trans-
fer arrangement for provision of
support services to locally managed
irrigation systems for technical and fi-
nancial consultation, dispute resolu-
tion, and political lobbying. Experi-
ence in Colombia and elsewhere sug-
gests that such services are needed af-
ter transfer to help local management
be viable in the long run.
Regarding this last point, in order to
minimize costs and ensure a demand-
driven approach, it may be worthwhile for
governments to facilitate development of
provincial or national-level water user net-
work organizations, such as the Federriego
in Colombia (García-Betancourt 1995), to
provide such services after devolution.
Despite the last point above, it ap-
pears likely that governments will still
need to play roles in technical auditing or
consultation, and dispute mediation, pro-
viding partial subsidies designed to stimu-
late (not discourage) local investment, pro-
viding financial security for long-term
capital-replacement funds raised by
WUAs, water allocation, and water quality
regulation upstream. Perhaps the most fun-
damental recommendation that could be
made at this point is that governments that
have adopted devolution policies but are
still designing programs to implement
them should develop integrated, compre-
hensive devolution strategies that are in-
ternally consistent and that promote the
self-reliance of local management. Ad-
equate investments should be made in
monitoring and evaluation of management
transfer and, where necessary in action re-
search, so as to ensure that the change
process is also an effective learning pro-
cess.35
ANNEX 1
Map of RUT District
RUT
The Roldanillo-La Union-Toro (RUT) irri-
gation district is located in the prosperous
Cauca valley and serves 9,700 hectares. It
was built between 1958 and 1971. Water is
pumped from the Cauca river through
three pumping stations for both irrigation
and drainage.  The district has predomi-
nantly smallholdings, with 75 percent of
holdings being less than 5 hectares each.
The main crops are cotton, grape, fruit
trees, and sugarcane. As can be seen in fig-
ure 7, rainfall is bimodal. The irrigation re-
quirement alternates with rainfall but is
spread throughout the year. Water is deliv-
ered on demand and is pumped a second
time from the canal stet to farmers’ fields.
Hence, pumping constitutes a major cost
to farmers.
Rio Recio
The Rio Recio district is located in the
Tolima valley in central Colombia, which
is one of the most productive agricultural
areas of the country. Constructed in 1951,
it is a river diversion gravity flow scheme
ANNEX 2
Background Information on the Five Sample Districts36
with open canals serving 10,200 hectares
of steep to undulating terrain. Average
landholding sizes are the largest of the five
schemes, with 75 percent of landholdings
being more than 10 hectares each. Main
crops are rice, sorghum and cotton, which
are irrigated on demand during periods of
water abundance or on rotation during
water shortages. The demand-based deliv-
ery system, 234 control structures, and
water measurement structures down to
farm inlets constitute a highly flexible and
management intensive system.
Samacá
The Samacá irrigation district is located in
Boyaca state, northeast of Bogota, in a nar-
row valley rimmed with steep hills. It is at
an elevation between 2,600 and 3,000
meters. Water is supplied by two reservoirs
with a combined total storage capacity of
6.2 million cubic meters. Water is delivered
along hillsides on both sides of the valley
and onto the valley floor. Irrigation is used
almost year-round and is supplemental
during the two rainy periods of the year, in
March–May and October–November (fig-
ure 7). The district was constructed in
1941 and presently serves 3,000 hectares,
of which 46 percent is on hillsides and 54
percent on the valley floor. Of all farm
holdings in the scheme 95 percent is less
than 5 hectares each.  The main crops are
onion, potato,  pea,  pasture, and veg-
etables. Water delivery to farms is sched-
uled weekly on the basis of written re-
quests from farmers submitted to ditch ten-
ders. On the hillsides, water is delivered to
small temporary storage tanks, each serv-
ing 10–20 hectares, from which water is
directed to individual fields through bur-
ied plastic pipes that use gravity pressure.
In the valley, water is normally directed to
small temporary storage ponds at farm in-
takes, out of which water is pumped onto
each field. Significant differences in the so-
cioeconomic status exist between poorer
smallholders on the hillsides and more
wealthy and influential large holders in
the valley. However, regarding water, these
tensions have been partly offset by the dis-
tribution of small farms upstream and a
considerable amount of return flow from
the hillsides being reused on larger farms
in the valley and at  the tail end of the sys-
tem.
San Rafael
San Rafael district is a small river lift
scheme built in 1970. It irrigates 560 hect-
ares of land located in the mountainous
Boyaca State. Water is pumped from the
Chicamocha river (through a pump with a
capacity of 0.60 m
3/s) and delivered to in-
dividual farms via a buried pipe system.
Pasture and vegetables are the main crops
grown. Soils and water have a high salin-
ity content and much of the area is poorly
drained during rainy times of the year. Ir-
rigation is virtually unnecessary during
the peak rainy periods in April–May and
October–November (figure 7). On the basis
of farmer requests, which must be submit-
ted at least 2 days in advance, district staff
make water delivery schedules. Before wa-
ter can be delivered to a farm the area fee
should be paid up to date. Recently, the
district has been incorporated into the
larger Chicamocha irrigation district that is
currently under development. San Rafael
is the first, and still the only unit in the
larger district to be functional.
Maria La Baja
The Maria La Baja irrigation district is lo-
cated 50 km south of Cartagena City near
the Atlantic coast. Its water supply comes
from two reservoirs fed by two rivers.37
Together, the reservoirs have a total storage
capacity of 235.5 million cubic meters
and a combined discharge capacity of 20
m
3/s. The original design area was pro-
jected to be 19,600 hectares, but 32 years
after construction in 1965, the actual irri-
gated area is only 9,260 hectares. Siltation
in the reservoirs, fed by deforestation in
the watershed, is cause for rising concern.
The irrigated area has been shrinking in
recent years. The shortfall in expectations
and shrinkage has mainly been due to de-
sign errors, flooding, poor drainage, and
waterlogging. There are also socioeco-
nomic constraints such as extreme poverty.
Bolivar State is in one of the poorer regions
of the country and small farmers are often
undercapitalized. Seventy-five percent of
landholdings in the irrigated area is less
than 10 hectares each. Sometimes, farmers
cannot afford to  purchase  seeds  or other
inputs or obtain credit. Also, a consider-
able amount of the potentially irrigable
land in the scheme is used for cattle ranch-
ing by wealthy farmers.
Topography in the irrigated area
ranges from a slope of 12 percent near the
mountains to flat land in swampy, flooded
areas at the tail end of the system. By the
end of the rainy season, the water table
depth is within 0.50 of a meter over 80
percent of the area. On average, rainfall is
relatively high (1,890 mm per year) but it
is highly irregular. The most important
crop is rice. Sorghum, pasture, plantains,
cassava, and maize are also grown. As in
other districts in Colombia, water deliver-
ies are based on requests received from
farmers, with the precondition that fee pay-
ments are up to date. It is reported that
there are many problems with the design
and construction of the scheme and many
structures are in disrepair.38
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